Hegel's "historical spirit" is not only cunning. He still lacks a sense of taste and at times resembles a mediocre composer of operetta librettos, whose jokes are cumbersome and awkward. There are many examples of this.
So, few people know that the famous twentieth congress of the CPSU, at which N. Khrushchev in his closed report "exposed the personality cult of Stalin" and announced peaceful coexistence with capitalism, one of his decrees stopped locomotive building in the Soviet Union. The irony of the situation is that one of the most popular songs in the pre-war USSR was a song about a steam locomotive that carries children of revolutionaries to the “bright communist tomorrow”:
Our steam locomotive, fly forward! Stop in the Commune! We have no other way, We have a rifle in our hands!
Now it is obvious to many that it was the 20th Congress that marked the turning point in the slide towards the crisis of Soviet socialism in the USSR; it largely predetermined its destruction in the era of the so-called perestroika. No wonder Gorbachev and his associates (including the sinister figure of Alexander Yakovlev, who did not hide his hatred of the USSR, socialism and Lenin) called themselves "children of the 20th Congress." All anti-Soviet dissidents called themselves the same name, who began with calls for a return to "Leninist principles" and ended with praises of the most savage, robber, shameless capitalism.
Of course, formally, neither Khrushchev nor other leaders of the party and government in February 1956 thought about anything like that. Moreover, along with criticism, the positive role of Stalin in history was also noted. And the personality cult was interpreted as if proceeding from Lenin's judgments and assessments. Indeed, in the last years of his life, Vladimir Ilyich, seeing what an exaggerated, almost religious veneration was forming around his name, more than once explained that the theory of the hero and the crowd is not a Marxist, but a populist theory, which Plekhanov had criticized. Lenin carefully read the National Bolshevik N. Ustryalov, who in the early 1920s predicted the degeneration of the communist power into a Bonapartist dictatorship.
In his "political testament" Vladimir Ilyich noted the shortcomings of some party leaders - from Stalin and Trotsky to Bukharin and Pyatakov, thereby as if wishing to show that these shortcomings should be taken into account by the party congress when personally considering the candidates for the new leadership of the country. Lenin was a firm supporter of collegiality in the leadership, for which he considered it possible to make significant compromises (remember that he forgave Kamenev and Zinoviev even for their outright betrayal before the armed uprising in Petrograd and later entrusted them with high party posts). However, in a letter to the congress, he noted that this "October episode ... is not an accident."
In the same way, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, there was nothing seditious about the idea of a peaceful path to socialism. Lenin wrote in his articles of 1917 that after the February Revolution there was a moment when the proletarians and peasants could gain power through the Soviets without an armed uprising, but this moment turned out to be almost elusive. In the last articles of Lenin, there is already an understanding that the expected world revolution has not come and the Land of Soviets will have to build socialism in a bourgeois environment. As for Stalin, the opposition in the CPSU (b) in the person of Trotsky and his adherents throughout the 1920s and 1930s (first within the country, and then from abroad) insisted that Stalin "went over to compromise" with the capitalist countries, that for him the state interests of the USSR are more important than the world revolution. The Trotskyists saw signs of this in their complex attitude towards the civil confrontation in China, in the strategy of the popular fronts during the war in Spain.
It is known that Stalin did not share the ideology of "permanent revolution", did not believe in the possibility of an imminent world victory of socialism, and tried to build peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between the USSR and the West to preserve the "first island of socialism". Hypocritically scolding Stalin at the 20th Congress, Khrushchev, with his course "towards the peaceful coexistence of socialism and capitalism", only continued politics.
So, formally, it would be incorrect to say that under Stalin, a steam locomotive of Soviet socialism rushed to the Kommuna station in the same way as in 1917, and Khrushchev stopped it and ordered it to be dismantled for parts. But his declarative proclamation that "the present generation will live under communism" turned out to be an irresponsible bluff and still does not leave the lips of mockers.
In 1956, Khrushchev and his team really did something that radically undermined the foundation of Soviet socialism, predetermined the crisis of both himself and the left movement around the world. And intuitively they understood that they were doing something wrong, that people would not understand and would not forgive them, hence the atmosphere of extreme secrecy, in which the "exposure of the cult of Stalin" took place.
As you know, Khrushchev, preparing to criticize Stalin, was afraid to make an open presentation to the press and foreign guests who were at the congress and would spread his words throughout the country and around the world. His report was read out on the last day of the congress, February 25, at a closed session. As the participants testify, the congress was actually closed, and the delegates began to disperse, and their places were taken by employees of the Central Committee apparatus.
No stenography was carried out and the report was not included in the published materials of the congress; only a few days later, a short decree "On the personality cult and its consequences" was published. After Khrushchev's speech, the delegates were not given the opportunity to make assessments and objections, they were asked to take the said "into consideration." The text of the report was then circulated to party organizations, where it was read to party members and "activists". It was no longer intended for the ears of most non-partisan citizens. Khrushchev banned the reproduction of the text of the report, and for the first time the report got into the open press only many decades later, during the years of perestroika, in 1989.